Tuesday, April 23, 2013
The Fiat Emperor Has No Clothes
Forbes
Thursday, April 18, 2013
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2013/04/18/the-fiat-emperor-has-no-clothes/
A piece from Paul Krugman in The New York Times this week criticizes bitcoin for being antisocial and for not having a State-controlled supply while secretly admiring its powerful abstractness.
As a complicit minion in the State’s appropriation of the monetary unit, Krugman perpetuates ‘The State Theory of Money’ myth that the sovereign’s power to collect taxes and declare legal tender imbues a currency with ultimate value.
While that may be a reason to acquire a certain amount of government fiat currency, it is a transitory value because in the end it is still based on a State-sanctioned illusion. Anyone who has visited a weekend flea market has noticed the old coin and currency collector displays filled with past experiments in national fiat money. Those paper notes were at one time valued for something too.
We don’t want a pristine monetary standard untouched by human frailty as Krugman claims. We want freedom in the monetary standard untouched by the politicizing process.
In a Krugman world, centralized management of the money supply is preferable to a market-based outcome because the academically-informed economists will serve the best interests of the economy at large. However, our monetary overlords possess no special knowledge or secret sauce that justifies dictatorial control over money any more than it would justify dictatorial control over the market for something like soda beverages or dog food. Trust in mathematics trumps trust in central bankers.
The question of political control over a monetary system is the greatest litmus test for discovering those that seek control over others. Usually, it will be cloaked in terms like full employment, price stability, temporary stimulus, quantitative easing, and economic growth, but manipulation of the money supply serves only to favor the issuers of that particular monetary unit.
Money has a lot in common with religion. At some level, it requires a huge leap of faith. Yes, a belief in gold requires this too as the non-monetary value assigned to gold is probably no more than 5% of its market price. However, this is also what makes bitcoin the ultimate social money because for its value it merely requires others, not the law. Money is already the most viral thing on the planet and the network effect exponentially reinforces that.
Krugman actually struggles to assert that bitcoin is antisocial because he cites economist Paul Samuelson who once declared that money is a “social contrivance,” not something that stands outside society. Samuelson is absolutely correct on that point and bitcoin stands firmly within society. It is no one’s right to question why some place value on bitcoin and some do not since all value is subjective. The rationale for assigning value to bitcoin is as varied as the human fabric itself.
In this context, society can be defined as those mutual users willing to agree to a medium of exchange and a store of value. Since bitcoin, just as the Internet, recognizes no political boundaries, Krugman resists seeing the global monetary unit as something social. Krugman sees society only as a multitude of aggregated fiefdoms where he is the emperor’s cherished tailor.
Though, just like the untainted child in the Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale, some of us are beginning to notice. It’s not the illusion itself that so offends our sensibilities, but more the notion that a competitive illusion is not to be permitted. If a free market illusion voluntarily agreed to from the bottom up is so desperately feared, then the protectors of the State-sanctioned illusion must not have the most benevolent of motives in store for us plebeians.
I don’t know about you, but I for one can stand up and exclaim: “the fiat emperor has no clothes!” What if more of us did?
Friday, March 22, 2013
How Cryptocurrencies Could Upend Banks' Monetary Role
American Banker
Friday, March 15, 2013
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/how-cryptocurrencies-could-upend-banks-monetary-role-1057597-1.html
![]() |
Peter Šurda |
Peter is also a software developer experienced in the online payments industry and will present at the Bitcoin 2013: The Future of Payments conference in San Jose in May. His 2012 master's thesis at Vienna University of Economics and Business was entitled Economics of Bitcoin: Is Bitcoin an Alternative to Fiat Currencies and Gold? He's an abstract thinker, but the implications of his work are tantalizing: that digital money like Bitcoin opens up possibilities for banking without central planners or a lender of last resort, where interest rates and reserve requirements are driven purely by the market.
The debate between the full reserve bankers and the fractional reserve bankers is an old one and it has been explored in depth by the Austrian school of economics. More recently, the debate has been broadened to include the dynamics of introducing the bitcoin cryptocurrency, which is the functional equivalent of digital gold, since its supply is predictable and fixed. (There are currently 10.9 million bitcoins in circulation with a total fixed supply of 21 million expected to be mined before 2140, 99% of them by the year 2032.) The Austrian school economist Michael Suede and the technologist Eli Gothill have speculated that fractional reserve banking can indeed appear within a bitcoin monetary environment. This is where we join up with Peter.
JON MATONIS: I enjoyed your blog post, "Market Forces and Fractional Reserve Banking." Do you consider fractional reserve banking to be compatible with Austrian economics?
PETER ŠURDA: First of all, I would like to separate fractional reserve banking and credit expansion. On one hand, there are ways of increasing the money supply, in the broader sense, which do not require fractional reserve banking or changes in the monetary base such as a system based on the principle of mutual credit like LETS [local exchange trading systems], or a fiat currency that uses bitcoin as reserves (i.e. they are not claims in the sense that Ludwig von Mises uses them, but they act as full substitutes). From the opposite direction, fractional reserve banking does not necessarily lead to credit expansion.
I agree with the full reservists that credit expansion has the effects described by the Austrian Business Cycle Theory. However, I agree with the free bankers that fractional reserve banking is not necessarily a violation of property rights and other ways of increasing the money supply also are not necessarily a violation of property rights.
So I think that the economic and legal analysis are two separate issues and need to be addressed separately. I avoided the legal analysis in my thesis and concentrated on Austrian Business Cycle Theory and policy issues, but in an earlier draft I have several pages about legal aspects too, and I discussed the topic with [the legal theorist] Stephan Kinsella.
JON MATONIS: How does a nonpolitical cryptocurrency like bitcoin alter the landscape in the "full reserve" versus "fractional reserve" banking debate?
PETER ŠURDA: Austrians have made arguments in the past that lead to the conclusion that fractional reserve banking does not necessarily lead to credit expansion, even though they never explicitly formulated it this way and might not have realized the connection. The reason is that if credit instruments do not decrease transaction costs over the monetary base, they are unlikely to act as a part of the money supply. Bitcoin shows that this is not only a hypothetical but empirically possible to implement. With Bitcoin, it is much less likely that credit expansion will occur.
In other words, we need to separate two things. Why do people want to hold fractional reserve banking instruments, which may include the interest payments as one of the reasons, and why do people want to use fractional reserve banking instruments as a medium of exchange which, I argue, requires that the fractional reserve banking instruments decrease transaction costs. That they historically manifested themselves through a common instrument is an empirical quirk and not an economic rule. The ability to loan money is beneficial. Contrary to many Austrians, I agree that maturity transformation can be beneficial, and if the loan ends up being a liquid instrument, it also can be beneficial. But if it is so liquid that it becomes a part of the money supply, that's when it has a detrimental effect on the economy.
For full reservists, Bitcoin shows that the question of fractional reserve banking is less important than they thought. Fractional reservists, on the other hand, need to think about the nature of the mechanisms equilibrating the money supply. I tried to explain the issue to [the economists] George Selgin and David Glasner in comments on their websites, but I wasn't successful in getting my point through.
JON MATONIS: If bitcoin is digital gold, does that portend a future where a bitcoin standard (akin to the gold standard) can emerge or partial bitcoin backing for other currencies?
PETER ŠURDA: They probably can emerge, but the more important question is whether they would be preferred to bitcoin. Only something that provides a significant improvement would be preferred. I only know two potential candidates for that: Ripple and OpenTransactions.
JON MATONIS: In a bitcoin world, is fractional reserve banking only possible with offline substitutes (such as physical coins or cards, which can be traded hand-to-hand, containing the private key to a bitcoin address) or an intentional "fork" in the block chain ledger?
PETER ŠURDA: Hypothetically, the reserves can be offline and the substitute can be a clearing system like Ripple, so there are other possibilities too. But if I understand your point correctly, offline "substitutes" might have a higher chance of actually becoming full substitutes because they might have more obvious advantages.
JON MATONIS: As the recent block chain fork episode demonstrates, there is a need for offline bitcoin transactions to continue. Is this demand sufficient for a money substitute to evolve, such as offline substitutes with full or partial bitcoin backing?
PETER ŠURDA: This is primarily an empirical question, so we can't be completely sure about that. I think the probability for this is significantly lower than with the currencies that we've known historically. The end result is also path-dependent; for instance, it depends on how quickly bitcoin matures and/or adapts to changes compared to the potential substitute.
Fractional reserve banking does not come into existence magically. It must follow economic rules. With gold and similar commodities, fractional reserve banking comes into existence for these reasons: On the demand side, there is a demand for money substitutes, because they provide something that money proper does not; and on the supply side, money substitutes carry maintenance costs for the issuer (e.g. storage of gold) and these need to be offset somehow. The issuer can charge on holding (e.g. demurrage of bank notes), transacting (e.g. check clearing), or, obviously, externalize the costs through fractional reserves. From the point of view of an individual user, fractional reserve banking appears to be the least costly alternative. So obviously fractional reserve banking wins.
Putting it together: If there is a general demand for money substitutes, this leads to fractional reserve banking. Unless it's illegal. Then it might not. Solution: Have money which does not lead to the creation of money substitutes. Bitcoin shows that at least hypothetically, this is possible. I might even go a bit further and make this statement: If on a free market money substitutes do not develop even though there is no legal or technical obstacle for them, it means that the choice of money is Pareto-optimal since no change in the monetary system leads to an increase in utility.
JON MATONIS: Does a demand for positive return on bitcoin balances lead to an environment of competitive bank lending with risk-adjusted interest rates? And will this lead to an environment of fractional reserve banking with depositors offered higher interest rates in exchange for the additional risk premium of running a fractional portfolio?
PETER ŠURDA: Yes, I would say it does, but until there are industry niches that primarily use bitcoin, it is probably not much different from gambling.
This might lead to negotiable credit instruments with maturity-mismatching or maturity transformation, depending on which economic school you use for terminology. However, I don't think this feature alone is sufficient for these instruments to be accepted as full substitutes whereas George Selgin appears to think it is. Now, whether to call such a situation "fractional reserve banking" even though no credit expansion occurs is unclear. I lean towards yes, but there could be other interpretations.
JON MATONIS: How do you see bitcoin changing interest rate structures and lending practices?
PETER ŠURDA: Using Bitcoin for loans only makes sense for those businesses that use bitcoin as a unit of account, unless, of course, you're just speculating on the market but don't actually sell any goods or services. I think this will only occur at much higher levels of liquidity or until we can be quite sure that it deserves the label "money." Until these higher levels of liquidity are reached, the price of bitcoin will probably be quite volatile, which reduces the likelihood that people use it as a unit of account.
However, there could be niche market segments that use bitcoin as a primary medium of exchange and [bitcoin] mining is the most obvious candidate. For these, the unit of account function would make sense even if the global market penetration is lower.
Assuming one of these thresholds is crossed and the money supply remains inelastic (i.e. no significant credit expansion), the interest rate of bitcoin should be a good reflection of the time preference of those market participants that use it as a unit of account. Bitcoin also makes it much easier for lending to occur in a decentralized manner, I think. Rather than a small number of "too big to fail" institutions, we should see smaller specialized teams that act as facilitators without owning the liabilities or being liable themselves.
JON MATONIS: Can a free market fractional reserve system (as opposed to a central banking fractional reserve system) coexist with full reserve banking? Or will one drive out the other?
PETER ŠURDA: I think that if money substitutes emerge, fractional reserve banking will out-compete 100% reserve banking in the market. I deal with this a bit in an earlier draft of the thesis. If they don't emerge, on the other hand, we'll have a money supply equivalent to the monetary base and debt will not cause changes in the money supply. It would be viewed as merely highly liquid credit. I don't think they can coexist for a long time assuming the same underlying money in the narrower sense, of course.
Saturday, February 23, 2013
Bitcoin: Financial Deepening and Currency Internationalization
Moneyness
Thursday, February 21, 2013
http://jpkoning.blogspot.com/2013/02/financial-deepening-and-currency.html
Much of the conversation about bitcoin adoption focuses on its use in goods and services transactions. Breaking bitcoin news, for instance, draws attention to the fact that the Internet Archive will be giving employees the option to be paid in bitcoin. This focus on brick & mortar transactions means that the role that bitcoin financial instruments—stocks, bonds, and derivatives—have to play in promoting bitcoin adoption often gets overshadowed.
I'm currently reading Barry Eichengreen's Exorbitant Privilege which goes into the mechanics of what it takes to create a truly international currency. Eichengreen points out that prior to World War I the dollar played a negligible role relative to the pound sterling in world markets, but by the mid 1920s it was the dominant unit for invoicing payments and denominating bonds. Eichengreen's theory is that the US dollar became the world's go-to currency because of the emergence of a very specific financial instrument—the banker's acceptance.
An acceptance is much like a bill of exchange, a financial instrument I explained in my last post. Say a merchant decides to pay for a shipment of goods with a personal IOU, or bill. If a bank first "accepts" the bill i.e. if it agrees to vouch for the IOU, then this gives the bill more credibility. It is now a banker's acceptance.
According to Eichengreen, around 1908 or 1909, a concerted effort to foster the growth of the US acceptance market began. Up till then, US banks had been prohibited from dealing in acceptances and branching abroad—both these limitations would be removed by new legislation. To promote liquidity and backstop the acceptance market, the Federal Reserve, established in 1914, was given authority to buy and sell acceptances via open market operations. Furthermore, these acceptances could legally "back", or collateralize, the Fed's note issue. This feature was particularly helpful. Although the Fed was also legally permitted to purchase government securities, government securities could not "back" the note issue. Acceptances, therefore, became the more flexible and preferred asset for Fed open market operations, at least until 1932 when the limitations on government collateral were removed. According to Eichengreen, the Fed was the largest investor in the acceptance market and sometimes held the majority of outstanding issues on its balance sheet.
By the mid-1920s foreign acceptances denominated in dollars exceeded those denominated in sterling by a factor of 2:1 and more central banks held US forex reserves than sterling. London was on the way out, and New York on the way in. By 1929, the amount of outstanding foreign public bonds denominated in dollars (excluding the Commonwealth) exceeded sterling bonds. The lesson here is that a key step in the sequence of internationalizing a currency is getting it to be used in financial markets. This involves the development of deep, liquid, and accessible markets in securities denominated in that currency.
What sort of financial deepening do we see in the bitcoin universe, and how might we compare it to the dollar's emergence in the 1910s and 20s?
There are a number of healthy signs of financial deepening. I count five competing bitcoin securities exchanges that provide a forum for trading bitcoin-denominated stocks and bonds. These include Cryptostocks, BTCT, MPEx, Havelock, and Picostocks. A sixth, LTC-Global, provides a market in litecoin securities, a competing altchain. Holders of bitcoin needn't cash out of the bitcoin universe in order to get a better return. Instead, they can buy a bond or a stock listed on any of these exchanges.
The largest publicly-traded company in the bitcoin universe is SatoshiDice, a bitcoin gambling website listed on MPEx. With 100 million shares outstanding and a price of 0.006 BTC, SatoshiDice's market cap is ~600,000 BTC which comes out to around $17 million. SatoshiDice IPOed last year at 0.0032 BTC. With bitcoin only trading at $12 back then (it is now worth $29), the entire company would have been worth $4 million. Given today's $17 million valuation, SatoshiDice shareholders have seen a nice return over a short amount of time—much of it provided by bitcoin appreciation.
While SatoshiDice certainly provides some depth to bitcoin financial markets it has the potential to shallow them out too. Because MPEx charges large fees to trade on its exchange, a few of the competing exchanges have created what are called SatoshiDice "passthroughs". Much like an ETF, a passthrough holds an underlying asset—in this case SatoshiDice shares on MPEx—and flows through all dividends earned to passthrough owners. As a result, investors can get exposure to SatoshiDice without having to pay MPEx's expensive fees. BTCT, for instance, lists two different SatoshiDice passthroughs (GSDPT and S.DICE-PT) which together account for more trading volume than all other stocks and bonds listed on BTCT.
SatoshiDice's sheer size is to some extent problematic since Bitcoin financial markets are not as deep as they might appear. Should something ever happen to SatoshiDice, a big part of the bitcoin financial universe's liquidity will be wiped out, and this would ripple out across the entire field of bitcoin securities. The same might have happened to banker's acceptances in their day, except for one difference—the Fed was willing to back the acceptance market up. In the bitcoin universe, there's no buyer of of last resort to provide liquidity support to SatoshiDice shareholders.
Another impediment to deeper bitcoin markets is the hazy legality of the bitcoin securities exchanges. The first major bitcoin securities exchange, GLBSE, was closed in October 2012 with no prior warning. According to this article, potential regulatory and tax liabilities convinced GLBSE's founder to shut it down on his own behest. If any of the existing bitcoin exchanges were to grow too noticeable, one could imagine the SEC (or its equivalent) knocking on their door and forcing the exchange-owner to pull the plug. This sort of regulatory uncertainty can only dampen the liquidity and depth of bitcoin financial markets.
US authorities, on the other hand, didn't need to heed the rules when they built the banker's acceptance market. They created the rules. If financial deepening in the Bitcoin universe is to proceed it will happen despite regulations and not because of them.
The last headwind to bitcoin financial deepening is bitcoin's volatility. Eichengreen writes that the seesawing of the pound sterling during the war period encouraged financial markets to search for a more stable unit in which to express debts. The pound had always been anchored to gold (or silver), but it was unpegged from its century's long gold tether when the war broke out. Although it was repegged in January 1916, this time to the dollar, this did not secure confidence in the sterling's value since the peg was dependent on American support. When this support was withdrawn at war's end, sterling fell by a third within a year. Through all of this, the dollar continued to be defined in terms of gold, a feature which no doubt attracted issuers.
Bitcoin, on the other hand, has more than doubled in just two months. Back in June 2011, it fell by 50% in just two days. Like pound sterling during the war, bitcoin's lack of stability will do little to promote deeper financial markets.
Although I've stressed the difficulties that bitcoin markets face in developing more depth, the sheer amount of financial innovation I'm seeing from those involved in the various bitcoin securities exchanges is impressive. I wish them the best. The more they build up bitcoin securities markets, the better an alternative bitcoin presents to competing currency units.
[Disclaimer: I am long SatoshiDice and several bitcoin mining stocks.]
Reprinted with permission.
Friday, February 1, 2013
Market Forces and Fractional Reserve Banking
Economics of Bitcoin
Monday, January 21, 2013
http://www.economicsofbitcoin.com/2013/01/market-forces-and-fractional-reserve.html
Ralph Musgrave made a blog post "Lawrence White Tries to Argue for Fractional Reserve Banking" where he criticises some of the arguments made by Lawrence White in testimony on his fractional-reserve banking. I tend to agree with many of the things Ralph wrote, but here I'll concentrate on one aspect where I disagree.
Ralph writes:
"In fact there is no reason to suppose that “payment services” provided by a fractional reserve bank are any cheaper or “more economic” than those provided by a full reserve bank. That is, the ACTUAL COSTS (clearing cheques, issuing bank statements, etc) are the same in both cases. However, fractional reserve offers depositors interest on their deposits. And if you deduct that interest from the costs of payment services, then of course the cost of those services could be said to be reduced. But the reality is that this is just cross-subsidisation of one bank activity by another." [emphasis original]Ralph missed several things here.
Storage costs
The first one (which I cannot find explicitly in White's testimony), is that holding less than 100% reserves decreases storage costs. Even if the "excess" reserves were used in a different manner than loaned out, FRB would still have lower operating costs. Storage costs are a subset of what I call "maintenance costs of money substitutes". One might argue that if a withdrawal request arises in excess of reserves, the transaction costs of facilitating redemption (e.g. sale of assets) would be higher in an FRB. But the operational issues of redemption are not a feature specific to FRB. Even in a full reserve system, as long as branch operations are allowed, it is still possible that someone wants to withdraw more than the available reserves in that specific branch. The withdrawal would still have to be postponed and either the reserves transported from another branch, or some assets sold (the latter might be still chosen even in a full reserve banking if it has lower transaction costs, which is entirely possible).Bank notes
Why are substitutes substitutes?
In other words, a subsitute medium of exchange (money substitute) does not need to be a claim. Mutual credit is not even convertible into the base money. This leaves the question open: why are then some goods accepted as a substitute medium of exchange? The Austrians know this, but magically, when talking about FRB, they forget about it. They are accepted as substitutes because they decrease transaction costs. Practically all of the anti-FRB Austrians realise this, but only when not talking about FRB: Rothbard, Hoppe, Salerno, de Soto.
So what are money substitutes? Money substitutes are copies of the monetary base. They are persistently causally related to the original (e.g. by a peg, by using the same name, etc.), and they act as substitutes from economic point of view. And, at the latest since Kinsella's Against Intellectual Property, the Austrians increasingly come to the realisation that copying is not per se a violation of property rights. Analogously, creating an instrument which is subsequently then accepted as a substitute by the market is not, per se, a violation of property rights either.
Cross-subsidising
- They have lower transaction costs
- They allow credit expansion
Since this new good, this copy, satisfies both the demand for lower transaction costs and credit expansion, these two activities economically manifest themselves as one. The merging of these two activities by the bank is simply a response to this unified demand. As long as this new good, copy, satisfies both demands, the activities of the bank are economically inseparable. Therefore, there is no cross-subsidising, similarly as the manufacturing of tires is not cross-subsidising the manufacturing of chassis as long as people demand the whole car, even if some people have a fetish for the tires and want to ban car assembly.
How to fix this?
"Coinage reduces transaction costs compared to simple exchange, because of authentication and weighing. Bank liabilities also reduce transaction costs. But these are empirical factors, and not something inherent in all possible monetary systems."Now, putting it all together, if the transaction costs of monetary base are sufficiently low, money substitutes do not emerge, and thus there is no credit expansion. Bitcoin shows that such a system is empirically possible. It "fixes" credit expansion without "fixing" FRB. Is that a hack? No. Money substitutes are a hack, and credit expansion is a result of that. Bitcoin shows that a proper solution is possible.
Reprinted with permission.
Saturday, September 1, 2012
Monetary Laws of the United States
Monetary Laws of the United States, Volume 1, Narrative
Monetary Laws of the United States, Volume II, Appendix
Wednesday, August 15, 2012
Legalize Competing Currencies
Monday, August 13, 2012
http://paul.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2003&Itemid=69
I recently held a hearing in my congressional subcommittee on the subject of competing currencies. This is an issue of enormous importance, but unfortunately few Americans understand how the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department impose a strict monopoly on money in America.
This monopoly is maintained using federal counterfeiting laws, which is a bit rich. If any organization is guilty of counterfeiting dollars, it is our own Treasury. But those who dare to challenge federal legal tender laws by circulating competing currencies-- at least physical currencies-- risk going to prison.
Like all government created monopolies, the federal monopoly on money results in substandard product in the form of our ever-depreciating dollars.
Yet governments have always sought to monopolize the issuance of money, either directly or through the creation of central banks. The expanding role of the Federal Reserve in the 20th century enabled our federal government to grow wildly larger than would have been possible otherwise. Our Fed, like all central banks, encourages deficits by effectively monetizing Treasury debt. But the price we pay is the terrible and ongoing debasement of our money.
Allowing individuals and business to use alternate currencies, especially currencies backed by gold and silver, would expose the whole rotten system because the marketplace would prefer such alternate currencies unless and until the Fed suddenly imposed radical discipline on its dollar inflation.
Sadly, Americans are far less free than many others around the world when it comes to protecting themselves against the rapidly depreciating US dollar. Mexican workers can set up accounts denominated in ounces of silver and take tax-free delivery of that silver whenever they want. In Singapore and other Asian countries, individuals can set up bank accounts denominated in gold and silver. Debit cards can be linked to gold and silver accounts so that customers can use gold and silver to make point of sale transactions, a service which is only available to non-Americans.
The obvious solution is to legalize monetary freedom and allow the circulation of parallel and competing currencies. There is no reason why Americans should not be able to transact, save, and invest using the currency of their choosing. They should be free to use gold, silver, or other currencies with no legal restrictions or punitive taxation standing in the way. Restoring the monetary system envisioned by the Constitution is the only way to ensure the economic security of the American people.
After all, if our monetary system is fundamentally sound-- and the Federal Reserve indeed stabilizes the dollar as its apologists claim--then why fear competition? Why do we accept that centralized, monopoly control over our money is compatible with a supposedly free-market economy? In a free market, the government’s fiat dollar should compete with alternate currencies for the benefit of American consumers, savers, and investors.
As Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises explained, sound money is an instrument that protects our civil liberties against despotic government. Our current monetary system is indeed despotic, and the surest way to correct things simply is to legalize competing currencies.
Monday, August 13, 2012
Parallel Currencies And The Roadmap To Monetary Freedom
Forbes
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/08/07/parallel-currencies-and-the-roadmap-to-monetary-freedom/
It may not be as historically significant as President Nixon closing the gold window in 1971, but Rep. Ron Paul laid out the framework for the inevitable monetary confrontation of the future in his final U.S. Domestic Monetary Policy Subcommittee hearing on "Sound Money: Parallel Currencies and the Roadmap to Monetary Freedom."
The experts testifying included Robert Gray, Executive Director of the American Open Currency Standard, Forbes contributor Nathan Lewis, author of Gold: The Once and Future Money, and Dr. Richard Ebeling, Northwood University economics professor. Rep. Paul also included a prepared statement from constitutional lawyer and monetary expert, Dr. Edwin Vieira, who was unable to attend.
Summarizing the August 2nd Congressional hearing, Alex Newman wrote for The New American:
"According to Paul, the only way to stabilize the economy is by returning to monetary freedom and legalizing constitutional money. And until the U.S. government and the Fed get out of the way so the American people can choose what money to use without government coercion, the economy will never be truly stable and the supposed 'recovery' will be 'illusory,' he added. Meanwhile, other nations are already catching on to the hoax even as Americans lack the freedoms that citizens in some other parts of the world have to invest and protect their wealth from inflation."Largely echoing the sentiments of the chairman, the experts agreed that since the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913 the dollar has lost 98% of its value and that central banking is a form of central planning with no place in a free society.
Generally, the repeal of legal tender laws will allow individuals to decide what to use as the preferred medium of exchange and open the door to alternative currencies without threat of prosecution.
Rob Gray has been a tireless advocate for alternative open currency systems and he is right to say "leave our money alone" but I fundamentally disagree with his stance on legal tender laws. He believes that the only effect of legal tender laws is that if a debt is incurred without a specific agreement for a particular type of payment, then that debt can be discharged with the declared legal tender, or federal reserve notes. He even goes on say that, in addition to not calling for repeal, he is in favor of existing legal tender laws because they are so innocuous.
Although technically correct in stating that legal tender laws do not result in "tax obligation, exclusive requirement, and/or mandatory acceptance," Gray misses a major and symbolic effect that they do have and sometimes it's a chilling effect.
The legal tender laws have the effect of giving one form of money an artificial preference over another by making that form of money acceptable for the payment of taxes. Therefore, it indirectly puts forms of money without legal tender status at a disadvantage because people will perceive the ‘legally’ preferred monetary unit as having an underlying value greater than zero. That is why I oppose legal tender laws, Mr. Gray.
Then, a bit of bitcoin drama occurred when Rep. David Schweikert (R-Arizona) initially referred to the cryptocurrency as "um....what was one of them called?....something....coin" near the end of the hearing. To my knowledge, that is only the second time that bitcoin has been entered into the congressional record. The first being when Prof. Larry White mentioned bitcoin in his prepared testimony for the Free Competition in Currency Act of 2011.
Contrary to Nathan Lewis' statement that "every currency has an issuer," bitcoin does not require an issuer.
Proving once again that events in the real world unfold faster than those in power can comprehend, the participants probably did not know that bitcoin is currently the largest distributed computing project in existence today, passing the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence (SETI) project some time ago.
They probably were also not aware that bitcoin is a three-year-old decentralized bootstrapped currency with a $100 million plus monetary base that is immune from government regulation and, more importantly, immune from the crippling effects of monetary policy.
Wednesday, June 6, 2012
The Case for Monetary Freedom
Forbes
Thursday, May 31, 2012
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/05/31/the-case-for-monetary-freedom/
The Cato Institute has just come out with their Spring/Summer 2012 edition on Monetary Reform in the Wake of Crisis. It is the published version of their 29th Annual Monetary Conference which addressed the fundamental issue of how to prevent another global financial crisis without merely tinkering on the edges of the government fiat money regime.
"The first step is to rethink the role of government and central banks in the existing system, and then consider alternatives — such as the gold standard — that would substitute rules for discretion, increase choice in currency, and allow markets to determine the optimal quantity of money. After nearly a century of U.S. central banking, it's time to reconsider whether the Federal Reserve's monopoly status, discretion, and growing regulatory powers are more a source of crisis than a cure."Always relevant and informative, this issue has two particular noteworthy addresses -- the first by Dr. Ron Paul and the second by James Grant of Grant's Interest Rate Observer.
Ron Paul is the Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and in 2009 he introduced the Free Competition in Currency Act. This article is based on his Keynote Address at the Cato Institute’s 29th Annual Monetary Conference, November 16, 2011, in Washington, D.C. In stark contrast to the Paul Krugman, Bill Still, and Ellen Brown inflationistas, Paul's keynote address, "Why Monetary Freedom Matters," passionately makes the case for denationalizing money and repealing legal tender laws as the only remedy to restore a functioning and free market monetary system:
"I took the position that I wouldn’t close the Federal Reserve down in one day. The Fed will close itself down eventually when it destroys the value of the dollar. But I don’t want that to happen, either closing it down in one day or waiting for a collapse of the whole system. My idea is similar to what F. A. Hayek (1976, 1978) had talked about. Why don’t we denationalize money, legalize competition, allow free markets to work, and allow free-market banking to work? I think we should legalize competition in currencies, which means that first we recognize the Constitution and repeal the legal tender laws.
I have a bill that actually legalizes competition. We also would have to address the subject of fractional reserve banking—I think what we have put up with in fractional reserve banking and the pyramiding of debt is atrocious, but there is a disagreement in libertarian circles about exactly what you do with fractional reserve banking in a free market—but that is a small argument compared to whether or not we should have competition in currencies and allow something else to circulate."Then, in "Banking Dysfunction," James Grant systematically exposes both the fallacy and folly of capital adequacy reserves and examines the misdirected regulatory thrust:
"Let us be clear: on Wall Street, there was never a capitalist Eden. There was, however, an era of capitalist clarity in which the owners of the banks and investment banks not only reaped the profits but also bore the losses. Insolvency, in the case of a nationally chartered bank, meant a capital call for the stockholders, the proceeds earmarked for the depositors and other senior creditors. It was, after all, the investors’ bank, not the taxpayers’.
What’s truly and importantly new in banking is the definition of cash. When cash was gold, or notes convertible into gold, the basis of credit was gold. There could be only so much credit because there was only so much gold. Today, cash is paper, and paper is the basis of credit. There can be a titanic volume of credit because of paper there is no end."In a separate Cato paper this month on "Competition in Currency: The Potential for Private Money," Thomas Hogan writes that, "the lack of participants in the private banknote market appears to be due to the uncertain legal status of private note issue and the rigorous prosecution of currency-related crimes."
Saturday, May 5, 2012
Robert Wenzel to Federal Reserve: “Leave the Building to the Four-Legged Rats”
Monday, April 30, 2012
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/04/30/robert-wenzel-to-federal-reserve-leave-the-building-to-the-four-legged-rats/
Somebody finally turned on the lights at the Fed. As a regular subscriber to Wenzel's Economic Policy Journal, I enjoyed reading the full text of Bob's landmark speech to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York last Wednesday. Kudos to Bob on garnering the invitation in the first place. Scott Horton joked on his radio program that it must have been like showing a card trick to a dog (in the words of Bill Hicks).
It's well known that the Fed has discreetly dominated economic journals to quash real criticism. Rather than hurl insults at Fed economists and central planners during a lunchtime gathering in the bank's Liberty Room, Robert tactfully exposed economic fact after economic fact that probably had some in the monetary priesthood questioning the morality of their own careers.
Even though it's a speech more entertaining than effective, this is the chance of a lifetime for an Austrian School economist and I am sure Bob didn't just go for the food. Here are some of the economic gems:
"I scratch my head that somehow most of you on some academic level believe in the theory of supply and demand and how market setting prices result, but yet you deny them in your macro thinking about the economy.Then, he turns his attention to gold:
I scratch my head that somehow your conclusions about unemployment are so different than mine and that you call for the printing of money to boost “demand”. A call, I add, that since the founding of the Federal Reserve has resulted in an increase of the money supply by 12,230%.
So you then might tell me that stable prices are only a secondary goal of the Federal Reserve and that your real goal is to prevent serious declines in the economy but, since the start of the Fed, there have been 18 recessions including the Great Depression and the most recent Great Recession. These downturns have resulted in stock market crashes, tens of millions of unemployed and untold business bankruptcies."
"In this very building, deep in the underground vaults, sits billions of dollars of gold, held by the Federal Reserve for foreign governments. The Federal Reserve gives regular tours of these vaults, even to school children. Yet, America’s gold is off limits to seemingly everyone and has never been properly audited. Doesn’t that seem odd to you? If nothing else, does anyone at the Fed know the quality and fineness of the gold at Fort Knox?
In conclusion, it is my belief that from start to finish the Fed is a failure. I believe faulty methodology is used, I believe that the justification for the Fed, to bring price and economic stability, has never been a success. I repeat, prices since the start of the Fed have climbed by 2,241% and there have been over the same period 18 recessions. No one seems to care at the Fed about the gold supposedly backing up the gold certificates on the Fed balance sheet. The emperor has no clothes.
The noose is tightening on your organization, vast amounts of money printing are now required to keep your manipulated economy afloat. It will ultimately result in huge price inflation, or, if you stop printing, another massive economic crash will occur. There is no other way out."And of course the memorable grand finale:
"Let’s have one good meal here. Let’s make it a feast. Then I ask you, I plead with you, I beg you all, walk out of here with me, never to come back. It’s the moral and ethical thing to do. Nothing good goes on in this place. Let’s lock the doors and leave the building to the spiders, moths and four-legged rats."
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
Sound Money Project Interviews Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr.
Part 1 of "Dollar in Crisis" series with Dr. Thomas Rustici on March 27, 2012 can be seen here.
The Sound Money Project Interview with Dr. Judy Shelton on March 14, 2012 can been seen here.
Friday, March 30, 2012
The US Government's War on Cash
The Circle Bastiat
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
http://bastiat.mises.org/2012/03/laundered-money/
By repeatedly refusing to print money in larger bills, the Feds make it harder to make huge financial transactions and can more easily monitor the financial maneuverings of citizens.

Despite this enormous depreciation, the Federal Reserve has steadfastly refused to issue notes of larger denomination. This has made large cash transactions extremely inconvenient and has forced the American public to make much greater use than is optimal of electronic-payment methods. Of course, this is precisely the intent of the US government. The purpose of its ongoing breach of long-established laws regarding financial privacy is to make it easier to monitor the economic affairs and abrogate the financial privacy of its citizens, ostensibly to secure their safety from Colombian drug lords, Al Qaeda operatives, and tax cheats and other nefarious white-collar criminals
Now the war on cash has begun to spread to other countries. As reported a few months ago, Italy lowered the legal maximum on cash transactions from €2,500 to €1,000. The Italian government would have preferred to set a €500 or even €300 maximum limit but reasoned that it should permit Italians time to adjust to the new limit. The rationale for this limit on the size of cash transactions is the fact that the profligate Italian government is trying to reduce its €1.9 trillion debt and views its anticash measures as a means of cracking down on tax evasion, which "costs" the government an estimated €150 billion annually.
The profligacy of the Italian ruling class is in sharp contrast to ordinary Italians who are the least indebted consumers in the eurozone and among its biggest savers. They use their credit cards very infrequently compared to citizens of other eurozone nations. So deeply ingrained is cash in the Italian culture that over 7.5 million Italians do not even have checking accounts. Now most of these "bankless" Italians will be dragooned into the banking system so that the notoriously corrupt Italian government can more easily spy on them and invade their financial privacy. Of course Italian banks, which charge 2 percent on credit-card transactions and assess fees on current accounts, stand to earn an enormous windfall from this law. As controversial former prime minister Berlusconi noted, "There's a real danger of crossing over into a fiscal police state." Indeed, one only need look at the United States today to see what lies in store for Italian citizens.
Meanwhile the war on cash in Sweden is accelerating, although the involvement of the state is less overt. In Swedish cities, cash is no longer acceptable on public buses; tickets must be purchased in advance or via a cell-phone text message. Many small businesses refuse cash, and some bank facilities have completely stopped handling cash. Indeed in some Swedish towns it is no longer possible to use cash in a bank at all. Even churches have begun to facilitate electronic donations from their congregations by installing electronic card readers. Cash transactions represent only 3 percent of the Swedish economy, while they account for 9 percent of the eurozone and 7 percent of the US economies.
A leading proponent of the anticash movement is none other than Bjorn Ulvaeus, former member of the pop group ABBA. The dotty pop star, whose son has been robbed three times, believes that a cashless world means greater security for the public! Others, more perceptive than Ulvaeus, point to another alleged advantage of electronic transactions: they leave a digital trail that can be readily followed by the state. Thus, unlike countries with a strong "cash culture" like Greece and Italy, Sweden has a much lower incidence of graft. As one "expert" on underground economies instructs us, "If people use more cards, they are less involved in shadowy economy activities," in other words, secreting their hard-earned income in places where it cannot be plundered by the state.
The deputy governor of the Swedish central bank, Lars Nyberg, gloated before his retirement last year that cash will survive "like the crocodile, even though it may be forced to see its habitat gradually cut back." But not everyone in Sweden is celebrating the dethronement of cash. The chairman of Sweden's National Pensioners' Organization argues that elderly people in rural areas either do not have credit or debit cards or do not know how to use them to withdraw cash. Oscar Swartz, the founder of Sweden's first Internet provider, a supporter of the phasing out of cash, argues that without the adoption of anonymous payment methods, people who send money and make donations to various organizations can be "traced every time." But, of course, what the artless Mr. Swartz does not see is that this is the whole point of a cashless economy — to make even the most intimate economic affairs of private citizens transparent to the state and its fiscal and monetary apparatchiks, who themselves hate and fear transparency like vampires do sunlight. And then there are the benefits that accrue to the government-privileged banking system from the demise of cash. One Swedish small businessman shrewdly noted the connection. While he gets charged 5 kronor (80¢) for every credit-card transaction, he is prevented by law from passing this on to his customers. In his words, "For them (the banks), this is a very good way to earn a lot of money, that's what it's all about. They make huge profits."
Fortunately, the free market provides the prospect of an escape from the fiscal police state that seeks to stamp out the use of cash through either depreciation of central-bank-issued currency combined with unchanged currency denominations or direct legal limitation on the size of cash transactions. As Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian School of economics, explained over 140 years ago, money emerges not by government decree but through a market process driven by the actions of individuals who are continually seeking a means to accomplish their goals through exchange most efficiently. Every so often history offers up another example that illustrates Menger's point. The use of sheep, bottled water, and cigarettes as media of exchange in Iraqi rural villages after the US invasion and collapse of the dinar is one recent example. Another example was Argentina after the collapse of the peso, when grain contracts (for wheat, soybeans, corn, and sorghum) priced in dollars were regularly exchanged for big-ticket items like automobiles, trucks, and farm equipment. In fact Argentine farmers began hoarding grain in silos to substitute for holding cash balances in the form of depreciating pesos.
As has been widely reported recently, an unlikely crime wave has rapidly spread throughout the United States and has taken local law-enforcement officials by surprise. The theft of Tide liquid laundry detergent is pandemic throughout cities in the United States. One individual alone stole $25,000 worth of Tide detergent during a 15-month crime spree, and large retailers are taking special security measures to protect their inventories of Tide. For example, CVS is locking down Tide alongside commonly stolen items like flu medications. Liquid Tide retails for $10–$20 per bottle and sells on the black market for $5–$10. Individual bottles of Tide bear no serial numbers, making them impossible to track. So some enterprising thieves operate as arbitrageurs buying at the black-market price and reselling to the stores, presumably at the wholesale price. Even more puzzling is the fact that no other brand of detergent has been targeted.
What gives here? This is just another confirmation of Menger's insight that the market responds to the absence of sound money by monetizing highly salable commodities. It is clear that Tide has emerged as a subsidiary local currency for black-market, especially drug, transactions — but for legal transactions in low-income areas as well. Indeed police report that Tide is being exchanged for heroin and methamphetamine and that drug dealers possess inventories of the commodity that they are also willing to sell. But why is laundry detergent being employed as money, and why Tide in particular?
Menger identified the qualities that a commodity must possess in order to evolve into a medium of exchange. Tide possesses most of these qualities in ample measure. For a commodity to emerge as money out of barter, it must be widely used, readily recognizable, and durable. It must also have a relatively high value-to-weight ratio so that it can be easily transported. Tide is the most popular brand of laundry detergent and is widely used by all socioeconomic groups. Tide also is easily recognized because of its Day-Glo orange logo. Laundry detergent can also be stored for long periods without loss of potency or quality. It is true that Tide is somewhat bulky and inconvenient to transport by hand in large quantities. But enough can be carried by hand or shopping cart for smaller transactions while large quantities can easily be transported and transferred using automobiles.
Just like the highly publicized war on drugs that the US government has been waging — and losing — for decades, it is doomed to lose its surreptitious war on cash, because the free market can and will respond to the demand of ordinary citizens for a reliable and convenient money.
Reprinted with permission.
For further reading:
"The end of the cash era", The Economist, February 15, 2007
Monday, October 17, 2011
Why the State Demands Control of Money
Mises Daily
Thursday, October 13, 2011
http://mises.org/daily/5749/Why-the-State-Demands-Control-of-Money
Imagine you are in command of the state, defined as an institution that possesses a territorial monopoly of ultimate decision making in every case of conflict, including conflicts involving the state and its agents itself, and, by implication, the right to tax, i.e., to unilaterally determine the price that your subjects must pay you to perform the task of ultimate decision making.
To act under these constraints — or rather, lack of constraints — is what constitutes politics and political action, and it should be clear from the outset that politics, then, by its very nature, always means mischief. Not from your point of view, of course, but mischief from the point of view of those subject to your rule as ultimate judge. Predictably, you will use your position to enrich yourself at other people's expense.
More specifically, we can predict in particular what your attitude and policy vis-à-vis money and banking will be.
Assume that you rule over a territory that has developed beyond the stage of a primitive barter economy and where a common medium of exchange, i.e., a money, is in use. First off, it is easy to see why you would be particularly interested in money and monetary affairs. As state ruler, you can in principle confiscate whatever you want and provide yourself with an unearned income. But rather than confiscating various producer or consumer goods, you will naturally prefer to confiscate money. Because money, as the most easily and widely saleable and acceptable good of all, allows you the greatest freedom to spend your income as you like, on the greatest variety of goods. First and foremost, then, the taxes you impose on society will be money taxes, whether on property or income. You will want to maximize your money-tax revenues.
In this attempt, however, you will quickly encounter some rather intractable difficulties. Eventually, your attempts to further increase your tax income will encounter resistance in that higher tax rates will not lead to higher but to lower tax revenue. Your income — your spending money — declines, because producers, burdened with increasingly higher tax rates, simply produce less.
In this situation, you only have one other option to further increase or at least maintain your current level of spending: by borrowing such funds. And for that you must go to banks — and hence your special interest also in banks and the banking industry. If you borrow money from banks, these banks will automatically take an active interest in your future well-being. They will want you to stay in business, i.e., they want the state to go on in its exploitation business. And since banks tend to be major players in society, such support is certainly beneficial to you. On the other hand, as a negative, if you borrow money from banks you are not only expected to pay your loan back, but to pay interest on top.
The question, then, that arises for you as the ruler is, How can I free myself of these two constraints, i.e., of tax-resistance in the form of falling tax revenue and of the need to borrow from and pay interest to banks?
It is not too difficult to see what the ultimate solution to your problem is.
You can reach the desired independence of taxpayers and tax payments and of banks, if only you establish yourself first as a territorial monopolist of the production of money. On your territory, only you are permitted to produce money. But that is not sufficient. Because as long as money is a regular good that must be expensively produced, there is nothing in it for you except expenses. More importantly, then, you must use your monopoly position in order to lower the production cost and the quality of money as close as possible to zero. Instead of costly quality money such as gold or silver, you must see to it that worthless pieces of paper that can be produced at practically zero cost will become money. (Normally, no one would accept worthless pieces of paper as payment for anything. Pieces of paper are acceptable as payment only insofar as they are titles to something else, i.e., property titles. In other words then, you must replace pieces of paper that were titles to money with pieces of paper that are titles to nothing.)
Under competitive conditions, i.e., if everyone were free to produce money, a money that can be produced at almost zero cost would be produced up to a quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and because marginal cost is zero the marginal revenue, i.e., the purchasing power of this money, would be zero as well. Hence, the necessity to monopolize the production of paper money, so as to restrict its supply, in order to avoid hyperinflationary conditions and the disappearance of money from the market altogether (and a flight into "real values") — and the more so the cheaper the money commodity.
In a way, you have thus accomplished what all alchemists and their sponsors wanted to achieve: you have produced something valuable (money with purchasing power) out of something practically worthless. What an achievement. It costs you practically nothing and you can turn around and buy yourself something really valuable, such as a house or a Mercedes; and you can achieve these wonders not just for yourself but also for your friends and acquaintances, of which you discover that you have all of a sudden far more than you used to have (including many economists, who explain why your monopoly is really good for everyone).
What are the effects? First and foremost, more paper money does not in the slightest affect the quantity or quality of all other, nonmonetary goods. There exist just as many other goods around as before. This immediately refutes the notion — apparently held by most if not all mainstream economists — that "more" money can somehow increase "social wealth." To believe this, as everyone proposing a so-called easy-money policy as an efficient and "socially responsible" way out of economic troubles apparently does, is to believe in magic: that stones — or rather paper — can be turned into bread.
Rather, what the additional money you printed will affect is twofold. On the one hand, money prices will be higher than they would otherwise be, and the purchasing power per unit of money will be lower. In a word, the result will be inflation. More importantly, however, all the while the greater amount of money does not increase (or decrease) the total amount of presently existing social wealth (the total quantity of all goods in society), it redistributes the existing wealth in favor of you and your friends and acquaintances, i.e., those who get your money first. You and your friends are relatively enriched (own a larger part of the total social wealth) at the expense of impoverishing others (who as a result own less).
The problem, for you and your friends, with this institutional setup is not that it doesn't work. It works perfectly, always to your own (and your friends') advantage and always at the expense of others. All you have to do is to avoid hyperinflation. For in that case people would avoid using money and flee into real values, thus robbing you of your magic wand. The problem with your paper-money monopoly, if there is one at all, is only that this fact will be immediately noticed also by others and recognized as the big, criminal rip-off that it indeed is.
But this problem can be overcome, too, if, in addition to monopolizing the production of money, you also set yourself up as a banker and enter the banking business with the establishment of a central bank.
Because you can create paper money out of thin air, you can also create credit out of thin air. In fact, because you can create credit out of nothing (without any savings on your part), you can offer loans at cheaper rates than anyone else, even at an interest rate as low as zero (or even at a negative rate). With this ability, not only is your former dependency on banks and the banking industry eliminated; you can, moreover, make banks dependent on you, and you can forge a permanent alliance and complicity between banks and state. You don't even have to become involved in the business of investing the credit yourself. That task, and the risk involved in it, you can safely leave to commercial banks. What you, your central bank, need to do is only this: You create credit out of thin air and then loan this money, at below-market interest rates, to commercial banks. Instead of you paying interest to banks, banks now pay interest to you. And the banks in turn loan out your newly created easy credit to their business friends at somewhat higher but still submarket interest rates (to earn from the interest differential). In addition, to make the banks especially keen on working with you, you may permit the banks to create a certain amount of their own new credit (of checkbook money) in addition and on top of the credit that you have created (fractional-reserve banking).
What are the consequences of this monetary policy? To a large extent they are the same as with an easy money policy: First, an easy credit policy is also inflationary. More money is brought into circulation and prices will be higher, and the purchasing power of money lower, than would have been the case otherwise. Second, the credit expansion too has no effect on the quantity or quality of all goods currently in existence. It neither increases nor decreases their amount. More money is just this: more paper. It does not and cannot increase social wealth by one iota. Third, easy credit also engenders a systematic redistribution of social wealth in favor of you, the central bank, and the commercial banks within your cartel. You receive an interest return on money that you have created at practically zero cost out of thin air (instead of on money costly saved out of an existing income), and so do the banks, who earn additional interest on your costless money loans. Both you and your banker friends thereby appropriate an "unearned income." You and the banks are enriched at the expense of all "real" money savers (who receive a lower interest return than they otherwise would, i.e., without the injection of your and the banks' cheap credit into the credit market).
On the other hand, there also exists a fundamental difference between an easy, print-and-spend money policy and an easy, print-and-loan credit policy.
First off, an easy credit policy alters the production structure — what is produced and by whom — in a highly significant way.
You, the chief of the central bank, can create credit out of thin air. You do not have to first save money out of your money income, i.e., cut your own expenses, and thus abstain from buying certain nonmoney goods (as every normal person must, if he extends credit to someone). You only have to turn on the printing press and can thus undercut any interest rate demanded of borrowers by savers elsewhere in the market. Granting credit does not involve any sacrifice on your part (which is why this institution is so "nice"). If things then go well, you will be paid a positive-interest return on your paper investment, and if they don't go well — well, as the monopoly producer of money, you can always make up losses more easily than anyone else: by covering your losses with even more printed paper.
Without costs and no genuine, personal risk of losses, then, you can grant credit essentially indiscriminately, to everyone and for any purpose, without concern for the creditworthiness of the debtor or the soundness of his business plan. Because of your "easy" credit, certain people (in particular investment bankers) who otherwise would not be deemed sufficiently creditworthy, and certain projects (in particular of banks and their main clients) that would not be considered profitable but wasteful or too risky instead do get credit and do get funded.
Essentially, the same applies to the commercial banks within your banking cartel. Because of their special relationship to you, as the first recipients of your costless low-interest paper-money credit, the banks, too, can offer loans to prospective lenders at interest rates below market interest rates — and if things go well for them they go well; and if they don't, they can rely on you, as the monopolistic producer of money, to bail them out in the same way as you bail yourself out of any financial trouble: by more paper money. Accordingly, the banks too will be less discriminating in the selection of their clients and their business plans and more prone to funding the "wrong" people and the "wrong" projects.
And there is a second significant difference between a print-and-spend and a print-and-loan policy and this difference explains why the income and wealth redistribution in your and your banker friends' favor that is set in motion by easy credit takes the specific form of a temporal — boom-bust — cycle, i.e., of an initial phase of seeming general prosperity (of expected increases in future incomes and wealth) followed by a phase of widespread impoverishment (when the prosperity of the boom period is revealed as a widespread illusion).
This boom-bust feature is the logical — and physically necessary — consequence of credit created out of thin air, of credit unbacked by savings, of fiduciary credit (or however else you may call it) and of the fact that every investment takes time and only shows later on, at some time in the future, whether it is successful or not.
The reason for the business cycle is as elementary as it is fundamental. Robinson Crusoe can give a loan of fish (which he has not consumed) to Friday. Friday can convert these savings into a fishing net (he can eat the fish while constructing the net), and with the help of the net, then, Friday, in principle, is capable of repaying his loan to Robinson, plus interest, and still earn a profit of additional fish for himself. But this is physically impossible if Robinson's loan is only a paper note, denominated in fish, but unbacked by real-fish savings, i.e., if Robinson has no fish because he has consumed them all.
Then, and necessarily so, Friday must fail in his investment endeavor. In a simple barter economy, of course, this becomes immediately apparent. Friday will not accept Robinson's paper credit in the first place (but only real, commodity credit), and because of this, the boom-bust cycle will not get started. But in a complex monetary economy, the fact that credit was created out of thin air is not noticeable: every credit note looks like any other, and because of this the notes are accepted by the takers of credit.
This does not change the fundamental fact of reality that nothing can be produced out of nothing and that investment projects undertaken without any real funding whatsoever (by savings) must fail, but it explains why a boom — an increased level of investment accompanied by the expectation of higher future income and wealth — can get started (Friday does accept the note instead of immediately refusing it). And it explains why it then takes a while until the physical reality reasserts itself and reveals such expectations as illusory.
But what's a little crisis to you? Even if your path to riches is through repeated crises, brought about by your paper-money regime and central-bank policies, from your point of view — from the viewpoint as the head of state and chief of the central bank — this form of print-and-loan wealth redistribution in your own and your banker friends' favor, while less immediate than that achieved with a simple print-and-spend policy, is still much preferable, because it is far more difficult to see through and recognize for what it is. Rather than coming across as a plain fraud and parasite, in pursuing an easy-credit policy you can even pretend that you are engaged in the selfless task of "investing in the future" (rather than spending on present frivolities) and "healing" economic crises (rather than causing them).
What a world we live in!
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, an Austrian School economist and anarchocapitalist philosopher, is professor emeritus of economics at UNLV, a distinguished fellow with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, and founder and president of The Property and Freedom Society. Reprinted with permission.Friday, September 30, 2011
Ron Paul Hoists the Flag of Hayek
Thursday, September 29, 2011
http://www.nysun.com/opinion/ron-paul-upping-the-ante-in-his-campaign/87502/
The first time I met Friedrich Hayek was in 1980 at California, where he was staying at the home of another economist. Then a young editor for the Wall Street Journal, I’d asked to call on the Nobel laureate for a book review I was writing. His host invited me for dinner. Before the meal, Hayek and I retreated, alone, to the far end of the host’s living room, for a chat.
Hayek died 12 years later at the age of 93. I never came to know him well. But this week I found myself imagining that were his long-ago collapse-into-a-coughing fit to occur in front of me today, I’d whip out a copy of a new bill in Congress, H.R. 1098, called the Free Competition in Currency Act of 2011, and wave that under the great economist’s nose. It’s hard to think of anything, even a pinch of the strongest snuff, being a greater pick-me-up for his spirits.
For Hayek was an advocate of, among other things, private money — competing currencies — and HR 1098 would end a ban on them that has obtained here in America since the Civil War. The new bill in Congress, introduced in March by Rep. Ron Paul, would repeal the legal tender laws, prohibit taxation of certain coins and bullion, and clean up other sections of our coinage laws.
It is not a measure the Congress is going to pass in a hurry. But it is being nursed by advocates of monetary reform, and it would be unwise to discount it entirely. Few, after all, gave Congressman Paul much of a chance to win passage of a measure to audit the Federal Reserve, but when it eventually passed it was with an overwhelming, bipartisan vote. It may yet be enforced by the courts.
The Free Competition in Currency Act is far more important. It comes amid a historic collapse in the value of the dollar to less than a 1,600th of an ounce of gold. The dollar has gained a bit of value in recent days, but it is still worth less than a sixth of what it was worth as recently as, say, the start of President George W. Bush’s first term.
One of the things the government has done in the face of that collapse is seek to enforce a prohibition against private “uttering” — that is, putting into use — of coins of gold, silver, or other metal as current money and making or even possessing likenesses of such coins. H.R. 1098 would end the ban on private uttering of coins and, presumably, stop any current prosecution of such uttering.
The drive for the bill is animated, if only in part, by the case of Bernard von NotHaus, who was convicted in March of issuing a private medallion called the Liberty Dollar. The government prosecuted von NotHaus even though the coins he issued were made of silver and are today worth much more, in terms of Federal Reserve Notes, than when they were issued.
Monday, September 19, 2011
The Free Competition in Currency Act of 2011
STATEMENT ON HR 1098 THE FREE COMPETITION IN CURRENCY ACT OF 2011
SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
_____________________
Lawrence H. White
Professor of Economics, George Mason University
House Committee on Financial Services
Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology
Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss my views on HR 1098, the Free Competition in Currency Act of 2011 (hereafter “the Act”). As an economist specializing in monetary systems I have studied and written for many years about the role of free competition in currency. Indeed the second book of my three books on the topic, published in 1989 by New York University Press, was entitled Competition and Currency.
The benefits of currency competition
It is widely understood that competition among private enterprises gives us technological improvements in all kinds of products, delivering higher quality at lower cost. For example, the competition of FedEx and UPS with the US Postal Service in package delivery has been of great benefit to American consumers. Currency users also benefits from competition. My research indicates that currency has been better provided by competing private enterprises than by government monopoly. For example, private gold and silver mints during the American gold rushes provided trustworthy coins until they were suppressed by legislation. Scientific appraisals have found that the privately minted coins were produced even more precisely than the coins of the US Mint. Private bank-issued currency was the most popular form of money around the world until government-sponsored central banks, with few exceptions, gained exclusive note-issuing privileges.
We do not rely on the Treasury or the Federal Reserve, but rather private financial institutions, to provide our checking accounts, credit cards, and traveler’s checks. The consumer benefits from the competition in payment services among banks. Consumers would likewise benefit from free and fair competition among coin issuers. Although Federal Reserve Notes and Treasury coins should of course be protected from counterfeiting, there is no good case for them to enjoy monopoly privileges in the market for currency.
HR 1098 would give currency competition a chance. It would not remove the Federal Reserve from the currency market, but it would give the Fed a stronger incentive to deliver the kind of trustworthy money that consumers want. The dollar already faces salutary international competition from gold, silver, the euro, the Swiss Franc, and other stores of value. HR 1098 would allow salutary domestic competition between the Federal Reserve Note and other media of exchange. The Fed will have little to fear from competition so long as it provides the highest quality product on the market. Continuing to ban competition from the domestic US currency market, or keeping it at a legal disadvantage, limits the options of American consumers who use money, to their disadvantage.
What sort of competition might we see if currency were free from legislated restrictions? Here is one example. In 1998 a non-profit organization launched the “American Liberty Currency,” a private silver-based currency intended to compete with Federal Reserve currency. In the year 2000 I wrote an article about the project, entitled “A Competitor for the Fed?,” published by The Foundation for Economic Education’s magazine The Freeman (vol. 50, July 2000). I was skeptical that the project would attract many users, absent high inflation in the dollar. But I noted then, and I reiterate today, that in a high-inflation environment “silver-backed currency with widespread acceptance would provide a useful alternative to the Federal Reserve’s product. Then, if you don’t like the way the federal government manages (or mismanages) the value of the fiat dollar, you aren’t limited to complaining. You can switch to the private alternative.” If double-digit inflation should unfortunately return to the United States, then the American public, as I wrote, would “find a very practical advantage in a silver-backed alternative to the free-falling Federal Reserve note.”
The Act offers three reforms. I will comment on them in turn.
Section 2 of the Act repeals 31 USC, §5103, which presently declares that “US coins and currency (including Federal Reserve notes …) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”
What are the likely economic consequences of removing legal tender status from US Treasury coins and Federal Reserve notes? The immediate consequences would be minimal. New forms of currency will not be introduced into the market any faster than the public is prepared to accept them. The longer-run consequence will be to enable a more level playing field for competition in the issue of currency.
Legal tender status is more limited in its scope than is sometimes believed. That Federal Reserve notes and Treasure coins have “legal tender” status does not mean that they are the only legal way to pay. Any seller or creditor may (of course) voluntarily accept payment by transfer of bank-account balances, that is, by ordinary bank check, debit-card transfer, direct deposit, or wire transfer. Traveler’s checks or cashier’s checks may be accepted. The seller or creditor may even accept foreign currency or barter. Measured by dollar volume, payments in Federal Reserve notes or coin are a tiny share of all final payments in the United States (less than 20% of consumer payments, nearly 0% of business-to-business and financial payments). The great bulk of payments are electronic transfers of non-legal-tender bank balances.
Nor does legal-tender status mean that acceptance is mandatory when offered at a point of sale in a spot transaction. Large-denomination Federal Reserve notes are refused at many points of sale, and lawfully so. Vending machines refuse pennies. Mail-order sellers may refuse cash of any denomination. Millions of legal-tender one-dollar coins are piling up in the Federal Reserve’s vault in Baltimore because nobody wants them.
Legal tender relates to the discharge of debts. The phrase “Legal tender for all debts” in 31 USC, §5103, quoted above, means that if Smith owes Jones $125, then Smith’s offering Jones $125 in US coins or Federal Reserve notes legally extinguishes the debt, even if Jones would prefer payment in some other form (say, a check). In other words, the creditor is barred from refusing payment in legal tender notes or coins.
There is already an important exception, however. Debts in gold-clause contracts, made since 1977, are not unilaterally discharged by offer of US coin or Federal Reserve notes. 31 U.S.C. §5118(d)(2) reads: “An obligation issued containing a gold clause or governed by a gold clause is discharged on payment (dollar for dollar) in United States coin or currency that is legal tender at the time of payment. This paragraph does not apply to an obligation issued after October 27, 1977.” [emphasis added] That is, the holder of a gold-clause bond is free to insist on receiving payments in gold, or in an amount of dollars indexed to the price of gold, whichever the bond contract specifies.
Removing legal-tender status from US Treasury coins and Federal Reserve notes generally, as Section 2 of the Act does, essentially broadens the gold-clause exception to allow contractual obligations to specify payment in, or indexed to, any medium that is an alternative to Treasury coins and Federal Reserve notes. It opens the competition not just to private checks and banknotes, but also to gold units, silver units, units of foreign currency, Consumer Price Index bundles, wholesale commodity bundles, Bitcoins, and whatever else a lender and a borrower might agree upon. If they prefer a unit for denominating their debt contract other than the Fed or Treasury dollar, they would be free to write a specifically enforceable contract in the unit of their choice.
Hand-to-hand currency does not need legal tender status to make it circulate easily. In jurisdictions where private commercial banks may issue circulating currency notes or “banknotes” (found today in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Hong Kong), banknotes have the same legal status as checks. That is, they do not have legal tender status. Any creditor might refuse them if he preferred to be paid in another medium. (In Scotland and Northern Ireland, only pound sterling coins are legal tender.) I have spent a fair amount of time in Northern Ireland, visiting the Finance Department at the Queen’s University of Belfast, and have observed the circulation of banknotes there first-hand. There are four private banks that issue notes, and all of their notes are universally accepted. Legal tender status is clearly not necessary to have currency that circulates widely and is commonly accepted for payment of debts. Currency notes do not need legal tender status any more than credit cards, checks, debit cards, or traveler’s checks.
Section 3 of the Act rules out federal or state taxes on precious-metal coins, whether minted by a foreign government or by a private firm. This section would allow precious-metal coins to compete with the US Treasury’s token coins (made of base metals, and denominated in fiat US dollars) without tax disadvantages (sales taxes on acquisition and capital gains taxes on holding, from which Federal Reserve Notes are exempt), and thereby a level playing field for competition among monetary standards.
Section 4 of the Act repeals Title 18 §486 (relating to uttering or passing coins of gold, silver, or other metal) and §489 (making or possessing likeness of coins).
Section 486 is a relic of the Civil War, part of an effort to bolster the use of the wartime paper “greenback” currency by banning competition from the private gold coins I previously mentioned. The repeal of §486, combined with the previous section, would allow silver and gold coins to compete with the Treasury and the Fed on a level playing field.
I previously mentioned the American Liberty Currency project. The mover of that project, Bernard von Not Haus, was convicted in March 2011 of violating §486, and presently awaits sentencing, for the victimless crime of producing one-ounce silver coins, of original design, that he hoped would compete with the Federal Reserve’s currency. Regarding this case I commend to your attention the article by Seth Lipsky, “When Private Money Becomes a Felony Offense,” Wall St. Journal, 31 March 2011.
The repeal of §486 would avoid a repeat of the injustice done to Mr. von Not Haus. I share Mr. Lipky’s view that “it’s a loser’s game to suppress private money that is sound in order to protect government-issued money that is unsound.”
Title 18 §489 of current law outlaws making or possessing “any token, disk, or device in the likeness or similitude as to design, color, or the inscription thereon of any of the coins of the United States or of any foreign country issued as money, either under the authority of the United States or under the authority of any foreign government”. Von NotHaus was also charged with violating this section. In my view §489 is redundant at best and over-reaching at worst. It is redundant at best because if there is any fraudulent intent in making or passing such a device, it is already outlawed under §485, which bans the counterfeiting of US coins. To outlaw “likeness or similitude as to design, color, or the inscription” [emphasis added] in cases where it is not counterfeiting and has no fraudulent intent, is far too sweeping. Taken literally, §489 outlaws all commemorative silver medallions—and if you go on eBay, you’ll find that there are thousands of them for sale—because it says that you are in violation of the law if you make or own any disk that merely has a color similar to that of a US quarter.
Conclusion
Competition in general creates incentives to provide a high quality product by taking business away from low-quality producers. Competition in currency is a practical idea that offers sizable benefits to the public when the quality of the incumbent currency becomes doubtful. In particular, US citizens would benefit from freedom of choice among monetary alternatives though the removal of current legal restrictions and obstacles against currencies that could compete with Federal Reserve Notes and US Treasury coins. HR 1098 would give currency competition a chance.
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/091311white.pdf