Showing posts with label germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label germany. Show all posts

Thursday, January 13, 2011

Book Review: When Money Dies

The Wall Street Journal and Andrew Stuttaford have just published an excellent book review of Adam Fergusson's When Money Dies: The Nightmare of Deficit Spending, Devaluation and Hyperinflation in Weimar Germany (2010, first published 1975).

From Product Description:

When Money Dies
is the classic history of what happens when a nation’s currency depreciates beyond recovery. In 1923, with its currency effectively worthless (the exchange rate in December of that year was one dollar to 4,200,000,000,000 marks), the German republic was all but reduced to a barter economy. Expensive cigars, artworks, and jewels were routinely exchanged for staples such as bread; a cinema ticket could be bought for a lump of coal; and a bottle of paraffin for a silk shirt. People watched helplessly as their life savings disappeared and their loved ones starved. Germany’s finances descended into chaos, with severe social unrest in its wake.
Money may no longer be physically printed and distributed in the voluminous quantities of 1923. However, “quantitative easing,” that modern euphemism for surreptitious deficit financing in an electronic era, can no less become an assault on monetary discipline. Whatever the reason for a country’s deficit—necessity or profligacy, unwillingness to tax or blindness to expenditure—it is beguiling to suppose that if the day of reckoning is postponed economic recovery will come in time to prevent higher unemployment or deeper recession. What if it does not? Germany in 1923 provides a vivid, compelling, sobering moral tale.
From The Wall Street Journal review, Stuttaford writes:
"The death of the German mark (it took 20 of them to buy a British pound in 1914 but 310 billion in late 1923) plays a key part in the dark iconography of the 20th century: Images of kindling currency and economic chaos are an essential element in our understanding of the rise of Hitler. Mr. Fergusson adds valuable nuance to a familiar story. His tale begins not, as would be popularly assumed, in the aftermath of Germany's political and military collapse in 1918 (by which point the mark had halved against the pound) but in the original decision to fund the war effort largely through debt—a decision with uncomfortable contemporary parallels (one of many in this book) tailor-made for today's end-timers."
For further reading:
"When Money Dies", Jonas Clark, March 17, 2009

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

The Death of Paper Money

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
The Telegraph, London
Sunday, July 25, 2010

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/7909432/The-Death-of-Paper-Money.html


As they prepare for holiday reading in Tuscany, City bankers are buying up rare copies of an obscure book on the mechanics of Weimar inflation published in 1974.

Ebay is offering a well-thumbed volume of "Dying of Money: Lessons of the Great German and American Inflations" at a starting bid of $699 (shipping free ... thanks a lot).

The crucial passage comes in Chapter 17 entitled "Velocity." Each big inflation -- whether the early 1920s in Germany, or the Korean and Vietnam wars in the US -- starts with a passive expansion of the quantity money. This sits inert for a surprisingly long time. Asset prices may go up, but latent price inflation is disguised. The effect is much like lighter fuel on a camp fire before the match is struck.

People’s willingness to hold money can change suddenly for a "psychological and spontaneous reason," causing a spike in the velocity of money. It can occur at lightning speed, over a few weeks. The shift invariably catches economists by surprise. They wait too long to drain the excess money.

"Velocity took an almost right-angle turn upward in the summer of 1922," said Mr O. Parsson. Reichsbank officials were baffled. They could not fathom why the German people had started to behave differently almost two years after the bank had already boosted the money supply. He contends that public patience snapped abruptly once people lost trust and began to "smell a government rat."

Some might smile at the Bank of England "surprise" at the recent the jump in Brtiish inflation. Across the Atlantic, Fed critics say the rise in the US monetary base from $871 billion to $2,024 billion in just two years is an incendiary pyre that will ignite as soon as US money velocity returns to normal.

Morgan Stanley expects bond carnage as this catches up with the Fed, predicting that yields on US Treasuries will rocket to 5.5 percent. This has not happened so far. Ten-year yields have fallen below 3 percent, and M2 velocity has remained at historic lows of 1.72.

As a signed-up member of the deflation camp, I think the Bank and the Fed are right to keep their nerve and delay the withdrawal of stimulus -- though that case is easier to make in the US where core inflation has dropped to the lowest since the mid-1960s. But fact that O Parsson’s book is suddenly in demand in elite banking circles is itself a sign of the sort of behavioral change that can become self-fulfilling.

As it happens, another book from the 1970s entitled "When Money Dies: the Nightmare of The Weimar Hyper-Inflation" has just been reprinted. Written by former Tory European Parliament Member Adam Fergusson -- endorsed by Warren Buffett as a must-read -- it is a vivid account drawn from the diaries of those who lived through the turmoil in Germany, Austria, and Hungary as the empires were broken up.

Near civil war between town and country was a pervasive feature of this break-down in social order. Large mobs of half-starved and vindictive townsmen descended on villages to seize food from farmers accused of hoarding. The diary of one young woman described the scene at her cousin’s farm.

"In the cart I saw three slaughtered pigs. The cowshed was drenched in blood. One cow had been slaughtered where it stood and the meat torn from its bones. The monsters had slit the udder of the finest milch cow, so that she had to be put out of her misery immediately. In the granary, a rag soaked with petrol was still smouldering to show what these beasts had intended," she wrote.

Grand pianos became a currency or sorts as pauperized members of the civil service elites traded the symbols of their old status for a sack of potatoes and a side of bacon. There is a harrowing moment when each middle-class families first starts to undertand that its gilt-edged securities and War Loan will never recover. Irreversible ruin lies ahead. Elderly couples gassed themselves in their apartments.

Foreigners with dollars, pounds, Swiss francs, or Czech crowns lived in opulence. They were hated. "Times made us cynical. Everybody saw an enemy in everybody else," said Erna von Pustau, daughter of a Hamburg fish merchant.

Great numbers of people failed to see it coming. "My relations and friends were stupid. They didn't understand what inflation meant. Our solicitors were no better. My mother's bank manager gave her appalling advice," said one well-connected woman.

"You used to see the appearance of their flats gradually changing. One remembered where there used to be a picture or a carpet, or a secretaire. Eventually their rooms would be almost empty. Some of them begged -- not in the streets -- but by making casual visits. One knew too well what they had come for."

Corruption became rampant. People were stripped of their coat and shoes at knife-point on the street. The winners were those who -- by luck or design -- had borrowed heavily from banks to buy hard assets, or industrial conglomerates that had issued debentures. There was a great transfer of wealth from saver to debtor, though the Reichstag later passed a law linking old contracts to the gold price. Creditors clawed back something.

A conspiracy theory took root that the inflation was a Jewish plot to ruin Germany. The currency became known as "Judefetzen" ("Jew confetti"), hinting at the chain of events that wouild lead to Kristallnacht a decade later.

While the Weimar tale is a timeless study of social disintegration, it cannot shed much light on events today. The final trigger for the 1923 collapse was the French occupation of the Ruhr, which ripped a great chunk out of German industry and set off mass resistance.

Lloyd George suspected that the French were trying to precipitate the disintegration of Germany by sponsoring a break-away Rhineland state (as indeed they were). For a brief moment rebels set up a separatist government in Dusseldorf. With poetic justice, the crisis recoiled against Paris and destroyed the franc.

The Carthaginian peace of Versailles had by then poisoned everything. It was a patriotic duty not to pay taxes that would be sequestered for reparation payments to the enemy. Influenced by the Bolsheviks, Germany had become a Communist cauldron. Spartakists tried to take Berlin. Worker "soviets" proliferated. Dockers and shipworkers occupied police stations and set up barricades in Hamburg. Communist Red Centuries fought deadly street battles with right-wing militia.

Nostalgics plotted the restauration of Bavaria's Wittelsbach monarchy and the old currency, the gold-backed thaler. The Bremen Senate issued its own notes tied to gold. Others issued currencies linked to the price of rye.

This is not a picture of America, Britain, or Europe in 2010. But we should be careful of embracing the opposite and overly-reassuring assumption that this is a mild replay of Japan's Lost Decade, that is to say a slow and largely benign slide into deflation as debt deleveraging exerts its discipline.

Japan was the world's biggest external creditor when the Nikkei bubble burst 20 years ago. It had a private savings rate of 15 percent of GDP. The Japanese people have gradually cut this rate to 2 percent, cushioning the effects of the long slump. The Anglo-Saxons have no such cushion.

There is a clear temptation for the West to extricate itself from the errors of the Greenspan asset bubble, the Brown credit bubble, and the EMU sovereign bubble by stealth default through inflation. But that is a danger for later years. First we have the deflation shock of lives. Then -- and only then -- will central banks go to far and risk losing control over their printing experiment as velocity takes off. One problem at a time, please.

Monday, June 7, 2010

Euro 'will be dead in five years'

By Edmund Conway
The Telegraph
Saturday, June 5, 2010

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/budget/7806064/Euro-will-be-dead-in-five-years.html


The euro will have broken up before the end of this Parliamentary term, according to the bulk of economists taking part in a wide-ranging economic survey for The Sunday Telegraph.

The single currency is in its death throes and may not survive in its current membership for a week, let alone the next five years, according to a selection of responses to the survey – the first major wide-ranging litmus test of economic opinion in the City since the election. The findings underline suspicions that the new Chancellor, George Osborne, will have to firefight a full-blown crisis in Britain's biggest trading partner in his first years in office.

Of the 25 leading City economists who took part in the Telegraph survey, 12 predicted that the euro would not survive in its current form this Parliamentary term, compared with eight who suspected it would. Five declared themselves undecided. The finding is only one of a number of remarkable conclusions, including that:

• The economy will grow by well over a percentage point less next year than the Budget predicted in March.

• The Government will borrow almost £10bn less next year than the Treasury previously forecast, despite this weaker growth.

• Just as many economists think the Bank of England will not raise rates until 2012 or later as think it will lift borrowing costs this year.

But the conclusion on the euro is perhaps the most remarkable finding. A year ago or less, few within the City would have confidently predicted the currency's demise. But the travails of Greece, Spain and Portugal in recent weeks, plus German Chancellor Angela Merkel's acknowledgement that the currency is facing an "existential crisis", have radically shifted opinion.

Two of the eight experts who predicted that the currency would survive said it would do so only at the cost of seeing at least one of its members default on its sovereign debt. Andrew Lilico, chief economist at think tank Policy Exchange, said there was "nearly zero chance" of the euro surviving with its current membership, adding: "Greece will certainly default on its debts, and it is an open question whether Greece will experience some form of revolution or coup – I'd put the likelihood of that over the next five years as around one in four."

Douglas McWilliams of the Centre for Economics and Business Research said the single currency "may not even survive the next week", while David Blanchflower, professor at Dartmouth College and former Bank of England policymaker, added: "The political implications [of euro disintegration] are likely to be far-reaching – Germans are opposed to paying for others and may well quit."

Four of the economists said that despite the wider suspicion that Greece or some of the weaker economies may be forced out of the currency, the most likely country to leave would be Germany.

Peter Warburton of consultancy Economic Perspectives said: "Possibly Germany will leave. Possibly other central and eastern European countries – plus Denmark – will have joined. Possibly, there will be a multi-tier membership of the EU and a mechanism for entering and leaving the single currency. I think the project will survive, but not in its current form."

Read the rest of the article.

For further reading:
"Whatever Germany does, the euro as we know it is dead", By Jeff Randall, The Telegraph, May 20, 2010

Sunday, May 9, 2010

Europe Prepares Nuclear Response to Save Monetary Union

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
The Telegraph, London
Sunday, May 9, 2010

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/7702335/Europe-prepares-nuclear-response-to-save-monetary-union.html

Great caution is in order. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far said little. The descriptions of the deal agreed by EU leaders in the early hours of Saturday are coming from the French bloc and EU bureaucrats. How many times during the Greek saga of the last four months have we heard claims from Brussels that turned out to be a distortion of what Germany had actually agreed, causing each relief rally to falter within days? They had better get it right this time.

But if the early reports are near true, the accord profoundly alters the character of the European Union. The walls of fiscal and economic sovereignty are being breached. The creation of an EU rescue mechanism with powers to issue bonds with Europe's AAA rating to help eurozone states in trouble -- apparently €60bn, with a separate facility that may be able to lever up to €600bn -- is to go far beyond the Lisbon Treaty. This new agency is an EU Treasury in all but name, managing an EU fiscal union where liabilities become shared. A European state is being created before our eyes.

No EMU country will be allowed to default, whatever the moral hazard. Mrs Merkel seems to have bowed to extreme pressure as contagion spread to Portugal, Ireland, and -- the two clinchers -- Spain and Italy. "We have a serious situation, not just in one country but in several," she said.

The euro's founding fathers have for now won their strategic bet that monetary union would one day force EU states to create the machinery needed to make it work, or put another way that Germany would go along rather than squander its half-century investment in Europe's power-war order.

Whether the German nation will acquiesce for long is another matter. Popular fury over the Greek rescue has already cost Mrs Merkel control over North Rhine-Westphalia and with it the Bundesrat, dooming her reform agenda. The result was a rout.Events are getting out of hand, and not just on the streets of Athens.

For now, the world has avoided a financial cataclysm that would have been as serious and far-reaching as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, AIG, Fannie and Freddie in September 2008, and perhaps worse given the already depleted capital ratios of banks and the growing aversion to sovereign debt

Bond risk on European banks as measured by the iTraxx financial index reached even higher levels late last week than in the worst moments of the Lehman crisis. The safe-haven flight into two-year German Schatz was flashing the most extreme stress warnings since the instruments where created forty years ago."We're seeing herd behavior in the markets that are really wolfpack behavior," said Anders Borg, Sweden's Finance Minister.

Credit specialists in Frankfurt, London, and New York feared a blow-up by Thursday afternoon, when ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet said the bank's council had not even discussed the `nuclear option' of buying Club Med bonds. The ECB seemed to be on another planet.

It was the fall-out from that press conference -- at a moment when markets were losing all confidence in EU leadership -- that had much to do with the DOW's 1000 point drop in New York hours later. This is not to blame Mr Trichet. He did not have a mandate to go further at that stage. The Bundesbank had blocked him, knowing full-well that ECB purchases of bonds is the end of monetary discipline and the start of a Primrose Path to Hell. As they say in Frankfurt, a central bank should be like pudding: "the more you beat it, the harder it gets".

It is pointless to fault either camp is this clash of Latin and Teutonic mores. The euro was never an "optimal currency area", which is to say it was never an "optimal legal and cultural area". It was a late 20th Century version of the same Hegelian reflex of imposing ideas from above -- making facts fit the theory -- that has so cursed Europe. Schopenhauer said Hegel had "completely disorganized and ruined the minds of a whole generation". Little did he know how long the spell would last.

But I digress. There is a difference between quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England for liquidity purposes, and use of this policy to soak up the debt of governments dependent on external finance to cover structural deficits. The lines are of course blurred. One purpose can leak into the other.

But whatever the objections of the Bundesbank, it seems that Europe's elected leaders pulled rank this weekend -- and high time too says the French Left. The reaction in Germany already been fierce. "The ECB is going crank up the printing presses," said Anton Börner, head of Germany's export federation. "In five to ten yeas we will have a weak currency, with rising inflation and higher rates of inflation that will act as a break on growth."

I don't agree with Mr Börner. The M3 money supply is contracting in the eurozone, pointing to the risk of a Japan-style slide into deflationary perma-slump, although the panic response to that down the road may well be to call in the printers. But there is no doubt that Mr Börner represents German opinion.

The EU is invoking the "exceptional circumstances" clause of Article 122 of the Lisbon Treaty, arguing that the euro is subject to an "organized worldwide attack". This is a legal minefield. A group of professors has already filed a case at Germany's Constitutional Court, claiming that the Greek bail-out is illegal and that the EMU is degenerating into a zone of monetary disorder.

Read the rest of the article.


Monday, May 3, 2010

Hobson's Choice for Germany, ECB

By Richard Barley
The Wall Street Journal
Wednesday, April 28, 2010

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471204575210413650656220.html

The euro-zone crisis risks spinning out of control. The Standard & Poor's downgrades of Greece to junk status and Portugal by two notches to A-minus, although only confirmation of what markets prices were already saying, may have broken already fragile investor confidence. The single currency's fate is now in the hands of the German government and the European Central Bank. None of the choices on offer are good ones.

Germany must decide whether to commit its highly reluctant taxpayers to a vast Greek bailout. If the package is too small, markets will conclude the euro zone is unwilling and unable to support its members, triggering contagion to other countries and a possible break-up of the euro zone. But if Germany agrees a big enough package to draw a line under Greece's funding problems for several years, as investors seem to be demanding, it must do so aware it is unlikely to get all its money back. After all, investors now suspect Greece's problem is one of solvency rather than simply liquidity.

The ECB's challenge is no less crucial: It must decide whether to continue accepting Greek government debt as collateral for its lending operations if all three major ratings firms downgrade it to junk. Under ECB rules, already weakened once to accommodate Greece, eligibility requires at least one investment-grade rating. Moody's Investors Service still rates Greek debt four notches above junk. It may retain that investment-grade rating if an aid package materializes—after all, global banks remained investment-grade even after Lehman's collapse, thanks to government support. But S&P's three-notch downgrade shows how quickly the situation can change.

Read the rest of the article.

For further reading:
"Opa! Greek Government Announces Yet Another Bailout, But Who is Really Getting Bailed Out?", The Agonist, May 3, 2010
"Germany Clears Rescue for Greece", The New York Times, May 3, 2010
"Greek Money Mystery", Adrian Ash, May 3, 2010
"The Euro Trap", Paul Krugman, April 29, 2010
"Sovereign Debt Crisis Past the Point of No Return?", Financial Advisory, April 28, 2010
"ECB may have to turn to 'nuclear option' to prevent Southern European debt collapse", Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, April 27, 2010
"The Euro Can Survive a Greek Default", Daniel Gros, April 26, 2010

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Proposed European Monetary Fund Advances

By Jack Ewing and Matthew Saltmarsh
The New York Times
Monday, March 8, 2010

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/business/global/09iht-euro.html

FRANKFURT — Greece’s fiscal problems seemed to be nudging Europe toward closer integration Monday, as the European Commission endorsed a German proposal for a European monetary fund to prevent future debt crises, while officials called for new regulations to prevent speculators from exploiting countries’ economic woes.

But details of the fund proposal were vague, and any plan faced political and legal impediments. A plan would also come too late to help Greece even if all European Union members agreed to it, analysts said.


For further reading:
"EU, ECB lock horns over IMF-style rescue fund", Marcin Grajewski, Reuters, March 8, 2010
"Germany and EU plan 'European IMF'", The Local, March 8, 2010
"Plans emerge for 'European Monetary Fund'", Andrew Willis, euobserver.com, March 8, 2010

Sunday, February 14, 2010

Greek Saga Won't Kill the Euro But the End May Begin Here

By Liam Halligan
The Telegraph, London
Saturday, February 13, 2010

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/liamhalligan/7230255/Greek-saga-wont-kill-the-euro-but-the-end-may-begin-here.html

Could the endgame of this Greek tragedy be a eurozone breakup? The single currency's supporters maintain that such an outcome is mere mythology.

Greece accounts for only 3 percent of the 16 member states' combined GDP, they say, and has lower debts than some of the banks bailed-out during sub-prime. A loan of E20 billion (£17.5 billion) would do the trick, we're told. That's less than the British government injected into either Lloyds or the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Such analysis sounds vaguely plausible. But its naïve and politically dishonest. Then again, the single currency was built on political dishonesty. That's because, at the heart of the eurozone project there was always a fundamental contradiction -- one that the architects of monetary union never dared to address. Now its being highlighted for them, whether they like it or not.

While the European Central Bank controls eurozone interest rates and the money supply, the size of each country's fiscal deficit results from the spending and taxation decisions of its own sovereign government.

How can you enforce collective fiscal discipline in a currency union of individual sovereign states, each answerable to their own electorate? The truthful answer is you can't -- not unless you subjugate the autonomy of democratically-elected politicians and, by proxy, their voters.

Voters don't like that. Neither do politicians. Faced with a choice between seriously annoying their own voters and seriously annoying the ECB, the most ardently "pro-European" lawmakers, even those with years of Brussels trough-nuzzling under their belt, will always side with their own. That's why the eurozone will ultimately break up -- whether Greece is bailed out or not.

The eurocrats blame "speculators" for the single currency's woes. That's a bit like sailors blaming the sea. The eurozone is ultimately doomed because, in the end, economic logic wins and the will of each country's electorate bursts through. This current Greek saga won't end the eurozone -- but future historians will identify it, perhaps, as the beginning of the end.

Many have said it's hardly surprising that Greece -- with its history of financial profligacy and capital flight -- has emerged as the eurozone's Achilles heel. A more germane observation is that, while fiscally wayward, Greece is also the birthplace of democracy. If the Greek population wants to get upset, throw out its elected politicians and reject austerity, it must be allowed to do so. I think they'd be mad, but it must be their choice.

If Berlin and Brussels try to impose their own view on Greece and the "cuts" come from outside, the situation will become absolutely incendiary. Protests will turn into full-blown riots. Greece will endure very serious social unrest. Deep-seated rivalries and suspicions between countries will be re-ignited. And for what?

Read the rest of the article.

For further reading:
"The Greek Tragedy That Changed Europe", The Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2010
"A Theory of International Currency and Seigniorage Competition", Yiting Li, September 2005
"How to Cut the Seigniorage Cake into Fair Shares in an Enlarged EMU", Jørgen Drud Hansen and Roswitha M. King, December 22, 2004
"The Enlargement of the European Union and the Redistribution of Seigniorage Wealth", Holger Feist, January 2001
"Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The difference of seigniorage wealth in EMU", Hans Werner-Sinn and Holger Feist, June 1, 1997

Monday, August 10, 2009

Germany's Gold is in U.S. Custody

By Chris Powell
Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee
Sunday, August 9, 2009

http://www.gata.org/node/7672

International journalist Max Keiser has just posted a nine-minute documentary he has done about the British government's gold sales that were begun in 1999 and now are disparaged as "Brown's Bottom," after then-Chancellor, now-Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who decided upon the sales and remains unashamed that they marked the bottom of the gold market. Keiser's documentary is based largely on an interview with Conservative Party opposition Member of Parliament Phillip Hammond, who is shadow chief secretary of the treasury and who remarks that the British gold sales seem to have been structured precisely to knock the price of gold down rather than to maximize the return to the British government. Hammond also wonders aloud whether "something other than achieving the best price" might have been the objective of the gold sales scheme.

But Keiser's documentary may be sensational for getting an acknowledgement from the German central bank, the Bundesbank, that Germany's gold reserves are actually in the custody of the United States. This is a detail the Bundesbank long has denied to others who have inquired and is potentially a matter of great controversy in Germany. It raises the question of whether the German gold reserves are actually intact at all or whether they have been used by the U.S. government as part of its long-time gold price suppression scheme or have been comingled and diminished with the gold reserves of other countries held in the United States.

While Keiser's documentary does not identify the Bundesbank spokesman who confirmed the transfer of the German gold reserves to New York, it does provide the date and location of the confirmation: March 17, 2008, at Bundesbank headquarters in Frankfurt. The documentary shows that Keiser was there and got the interview.

After his interview at the Bundesbank, Keiser remarks: "The most fascinating thing I've heard is that all the gold in Germany is in New York." Indeed.

Keiser's documentary is titled "Brown's Bottom" and you can watch it at YouTube here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzVhzoAqMhU

GATA hopes that its German friends will press this issue at all appropriate levels.

For further reading:
"Key German Newspaper Supports GATA", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 25, 2000